Copyright 2018 by Daniel Cohen

Printed in U.S.A.
Vol. 112, No. 4

NOT FULLY DISCRETIONARY: INCORPORATING A
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ABSTRACT—The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) pulls back the curtain
of sovereign immunity and allows private citizens to directly sue the
federal government for damages resulting from negligence. Passed in 1946
and never amended, the statute carries no limit on potential damages, only
prohibiting punitive damages and jury trials. Other than those procedural
limitations, the potential liability of the government is unlimited—except
for one single exception: the discretionary function exception. The
discretionary function exception shields the government from liability for
“the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty.”
Congress failed to elaborate on the definition and scope of “discretionary”
functions and has left this vague exception for the courts to interpret.
The Supreme Court has used a wide array of terms to describe the
discretionary function exception and has intermittently revived and
overruled prior language. The discretionary function exception has
therefore rested entirely on judicial discretion in practice, changing in
application based on the whims of the Court without any concrete factors
on which to rely. This Note proposes that the Court formally adopt a factorbased standard in interpreting the discretionary function exception, based
on five factors. By clearly articulating these factors, the Court can prevent
future courts from abusing their discretion in applying the exception. This
is especially important considering that such abuse could leave the
government either largely immune from the consequences of its actions or
open to crippling liability at every turn. The Federal Tort Claims Act was a
pivotal step forward in solving this problem in 1946; clarifying the
discretionary function exception today will be another crucial milestone.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States has enjoyed full sovereign immunity for much of its
existence, during which time private citizens could not sue the federal
government.1 This changed in 1946 when Congress passed the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA), which allowed private citizens to sue the federal
government for tort damages. The text of the FTCA operated as a limited
waiver of sovereign immunity, allowing citizens to sue the government “in
the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances.”2 In the seventy years since Congress passed the FTCA, the
courts’ imprecise and meandering interpretations of the statute have caused
no small amount of trouble.
This Note considers the FTCA’s discretionary function exception. The
discretionary function exception exempts the government from liability for
“the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the
part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not

1

See, e.g., United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) (“The United States, as sovereign,
is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued . . . .”); United States v. Thompson, 98 U.S. 486, 489
(1878) (“[The United States] cannot be sued without their consent.”). See generally Joseph D. Block,
Suits Against Government Officers and the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1060
(1946) (discussing the history of sovereign immunity in the United States).
2
28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2012).
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the discretion involved [can] be abused.”3 In other words, the government
cannot be sued if it is performing a “discretionary” function. The word
“discretionary” does not appear anywhere else in the text of the statute; this
requires the courts to define exactly what constitutes a “discretionary
function or duty.” The language of the statute’s discretionary function
exception has remained surprisingly unchanged to the present day. This
legislative silence is not helpful in clarifying the scope of the discretionary
function exception.4
The Supreme Court has interpreted and reinterpreted the discretionary
function exception since 1946, yet it has failed to provide a consistent
standard.5 Since the core purpose of the Act is to provide an avenue for
private citizens to seek recourse against the federal government, this vague
exception to the FTCA poses a continuing risk of swallowing the rule
entirely and shielding the government from all forms of liability. This
would take all of the bite out of the Act. Moreover, the stakes are high:
courts are balancing an important private right to sue the government for
tort damages against an equally important sovereign immunity protecting
vital government operations. With that much at stake, consistent and
prudential judicial decisionmaking requires more concrete guidance than
the Court’s interpretations of “discretionary” to date. Thus, the Supreme
Court should clarify the scope of the discretionary function exception by
articulating a factor-based standard that draws from its prior precedent.
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the FTCA’s text and
legislative history. Part II then summarizes shifting judicial interpretations
of the exception. Next, Part III examines the quixotic seven-decade attempt
by scholarly literature to either delineate the meaning of the discretionary
function exception or cure the exception’s inherent ambiguity. Lastly, Part
IV proposes a five-factor standard for the discretionary function exception
that includes (1) whether the government employee exercised a choice, (2)
whether the choice related to policy considerations, (3) whether the
government employee’s conduct, if performed by a private person, would
violate state law, (4) practical concerns over inhibiting essential
government functioning, and (5) a desire to minimize sovereign immunity
and allow private citizens to sue the government for wrongful or negligent
3

Id. § 2680(a).
This is partly because statutory silence can be interpreted in various ways. See, e.g., YULE KIM,
CONG. RES. SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS
16 (2008) (describing different possible interpretations of statutory silence).
5
See, e.g., Payton v. United States, 679 F.2d 475, 479 (5th Cir. 1982) (describing the courts’ failure
to define the discretionary function exception); see also United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea
Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 813 (1984) (claiming it is impossible to fully define the
discretionary function exception).
4
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acts by its agents, officers, or employees. This standard provides a sturdy
framework for future judicial application by combining the wisdom and
consistency of precedent with cabining the exception to ensure that it does
not swallow the rule.
I.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT

The FTCA was born from a combination of a longstanding need to
reform a burdensome private bill system and a freak accident on July 28,
1945, which began as a foggy Saturday morning in New York City. Shortly
before 10:00 AM, a U.S. Army pilot flying a routine transport mission in a
B-25 bomber ignored a low-visibility warning from air traffic control and
flew the plane straight into the Empire State Building.6 The accident killed
fourteen people and caused damage estimated at $1 million ($13 million
adjusted for inflation7).8 Following the accident, the U.S. government
offered reparations to the victims’ families; some, but not all, families
accepted. 9 In the same year, Congress hastened to pass the landmark
FTCA, giving ordinary citizens (such as the remaining victims’ families)
the ability to file a lawsuit against the federal government.10
Versions of the FTCA that would pull back the curtain of sovereign
immunity had been languishing in Congress for twenty years.11 For
example, Congress debated the first seedling of the FTCA on February 5,
1925; this debated bill, House Bill 12,179, sought to replace the
burdensome existing private bill system in which Congress voted on
individual small claims.12 It proposed to instead “create a ‘cause of action
for compensation in damages for injuries sustained and death resulting
from injuries to any person through the wrongful act or omission by an

6
Jennifer Latson, When an Army Plane Crashed into the Empire State Building, TIME (July 28,
2015),
http://time.com/3967660/army-pilot-crash-empire-state-building
[https://perma.cc/7EMDS5VU].
7
To determine this amount, an inflation calculator was used. See Inflation Calculator,
DOLLARTIMES, http://www.dollartimes.com/calculators/inflation.htm [http://perma.cc/9L2N-DC2S].
8
Empire
State
Building
Withstood
Airplane
Impact,
JOM
(Dec.
2001),
http://www.tms.org/pubs/journals/JOM/0112/News/News8-0112.html [https://perma.cc/3ZZX-X78K]
(monthly publication of The Minerals, Metals & Materials Society).
9
Joe Richman, The Day a Bomber Hit the Empire State Building, NPR (July 28, 2008),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=92987873 [https://perma.cc/ZXZ9-YL4C].
10
28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2012) (“The United States shall be liable . . . in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.”).
11
See Donald N. Zillman, Congress, Courts and Government Tort Liability: Reflections on the
Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 1989 UTAH L. REV. 687, 699–700
(describing the debate over the 1925 Public Vessels Act as an “ambitious rejection of sovereign
immunity in torts”).
12
Id.
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agent, officer, or employee of the United States government and to provide
the procedure therefor.’”13 This bill would have shifted the responsibility
for determining compensation for private victims of government
negligence from Congress to the courts, providing a judicial check on
sovereign immunity.14 The bill died in committee,15 but it spawned over
thirty proposed bills in the following years,16 culminating in the passage of
the FTCA.
Congressional debates in this period weighed the arbitrary17 and
burdensome18 existing private bill system with practical19 and precedential
concerns20 in allowing citizens to directly sue the government. The
discretionary function exception was meant to address the latter pair of
concerns, as Assistant Attorney General Francis Shea described at a
hearing on January 29, 1942:
[The discretionary function exception] is a highly important exception,
designed to avoid any possibility that the act may be construed to authorize
damage suits against the government growing out of legally authorized
activity, such as a flood-control or irrigation project . . . . It is neither
desirable nor intended that the constitutionality of legislation, the legality of
regulation, or the propriety of a discretionary administrative act should be
tested through the medium of a damage suit for tort.21

While the FTCA originated with Congress’s desire to at least slightly
draw back the curtain of sovereign immunity, the discretionary function
exception kept the curtain in place to protect certain essential government
13

Id. at 700 (quoting 66 CONG. REC. 3090 (1925)).
Id. (“Claims could be handled administratively by an executive branch agency or by a court.”).
15
Id.
16
Id. at 700 n.84 (citing 1 L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS § 59, at 2-54 to -67
(1989)).
17
For example, Representative Underhill noted that under the existing private bill system, “one
objecting Member of the House can strike the bill off the calendar and he need give no reason therefor.
He may not like the Member who introduced the bill because he wears a red necktie.” 67 CONG. REC.
10034 (1926).
18
Representative Stafford, for instance, wondered, “Why should Congress be concerned with these
little petty claims . . . . We want to be relieved of this distasteful and most disagreeable work.”
76 CONG. REC. 4836 (1933). His question was followed by applause. Id.
19
Representative Ramseyer in particular was concerned with the prospect of the government being
liable for “billions of dollars, which might threaten the life of the sovereign and the very existence of
the government.” Zillman, supra note 11, at 702 n.94.
20
On this issue, Attorney General Sargent wrote that “any acknowledgement by the Government of
liability for torts is a dangerous precedent and a radical departure from the long-established principles
of our law and Government.” 67 CONG. REC. 5688 (1926).
21
Zillman, supra note 11, at 706–07, 707 n.119 (emphasis added) (quoting Tort Claims: Hearings
on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R., 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 28 (1942)
(statement of Francis Shea, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States)).
14
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functions.22 Other provisions of the FTCA reflected this protective intent:
for example, neither jury trials nor punitive damages were permitted
against the government,23 and Congress mandated a one-year statute of
limitations.24 But the broad language of the discretionary function exception
largely served as the primary mechanism to protect vital functions of
government from a potential cascade of private litigation. In both the
legislative history and the text of the statute, Congress avoided discussing
the nuances of the term “discretionary,” leading to continuously shifting
judicial interpretations that persist today.25
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION TEST
OVER THE YEARS
The Supreme Court attempted to define the discretionary function
exception in myriad ways in the seventy years after the FTCA was passed.
Unfortunately, the oft-conflicting judicial interpretations only added to the
initial confusion over how to apply the exception.
A. Early Interpretations
The Court interpreted the FTCA in Dalehite v. United States,26 which
followed the Texas City disaster in 1947 in which 2,300 tons of fertilizer
stored aboard a French cargo ship exploded and killed over 581 people.27
Families of the victims filed hundreds of lawsuits against the government
alleging negligence under the FTCA, totaling over $200 million in personal
and property claims (over $2.2 billion adjusted for inflation28).29 The
Supreme Court ultimately interpreted the discretionary function exception
as protecting the government from liability for alleged negligent acts and
omissions in storing the fertilizer on the cargo ship.30
The majority stated that “[w]here there is room for policy judgment
and decision there is discretion,” and that “acts of subordinates in carrying
22

See id. at 711.
See Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, § 410, 60 Stat. 842, 843–44 (1946) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
24
See id. § 420, 60 Stat. at 845.
25
See, e.g., Wood v. United States, 845 F.3d 123, 128–29 (4th Cir. 2017) (explaining the current
messy state of the discretionary function exception).
26
346 U.S. 15 (1953).
27
Texas City, Texas, Disaster, FIRE PREVENTION & ENG’G BUREAU OF TEX. (Apr. 29, 1947),
http://www.local1259iaff.org/report.htm [https://perma.cc/Z7X2-PHUN].
28
Again, an inflation calculator was used to determine this amount. See Inflation Calculator, supra
note 7.
29
Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 17.
30
Id. at 41 (“In short, the alleged ‘negligence’ does not subject the Government to liability.”).
23
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out the operations of government in accordance with official directions
cannot be actionable.”31 The Court also opined that any alleged government
negligence because of its safety standards was a result of decisions
“responsibly made in the exercise of judgment at a planning, rather than an
operational level,”32 and it “refused to question the judgments on which
they are based.”33 These distinctions concerning the status of the actor and
planning versus operational decisions were the first examples of the Court
creating its own language to interpret the discretionary function exception.34
The Dalehite Court’s inventive language hid the pragmatic and
constitutional concerns underlying the Court’s strong deference to the
government’s activities, of which there are at least two. First, a $2.2 billion
award was exceptionally large, and the Court was likely hesitant to impose
such a heavy burden on the government.35 Second, constitutionally
imposing liability on the government’s activities would have essentially
substituted the appointed Court’s policy judgments for those of elected
legislators, raising separation of powers concerns because the Court would
then arguably be instructing the government how to allocate its resources.36
It is unclear why the Court did not simply explain these real practical and
constitutional concerns upfront, rather than couch them in artificial
distinctions between the status of the actor and operational versus planning
decisions. Dalehite began a trend in which the Court relied upon these
practical and constitutional concerns without explicitly saying so.
Two years after the Dalehite decision, the Court again addressed the
discretionary function exception when the Indian Towing Company sued
the government for the Coast Guard’s allegedly negligent maintenance of a

31

Id. at 36.
Id. at 42.
33
Id. at 43.
34
The Court later rejected both distinctions. See, e.g., United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 325–
26 (1991) (“Discretionary conduct is not confined to the policy or planning level . . . . There [is] no
suggestion that decisions made at an operational level could not also be based on policy.”); United
States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 813 (1984)
(“[I]t is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the actor, that governs whether the
discretionary function exception applies . . . .”).
35
Indeed, the dissent noted this latent concern. See Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 54 (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) (“It is obvious that the Court’s only choice is to hold the Government’s liability to be
nothing or to be very heavy, indeed.”).
36
Id. at 43 (“The power to adopt regulations or by-laws . . . are generally regarded as discretionary,
because, in their nature, they are legislative.” (quoting Weightman v. Corp. of Wash., 66 U.S. (1 Black)
39, 49 (1861))). Fortunately, both the practical and constitutional concerns in Dalehite were later
avoided when Congress provided nearly $17 million in compensation for the victims through
legislation. See MELVIN M. BELLI, “READY FOR THE PLAINTIFF!” 83–85 (1965) (discussing the passing
of “special acts” under the Federal Torts Claims Act to compensate the victims).
32
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lighthouse that caused cargo damage.37 The Court, drawing on Dalehite’s
operational versus planning distinction, held that this negligence involved
the operational level of government, not the planning level; it thus found
the government liable for damages under the FTCA.38 Notably, this case
only involved damages of $62,659.70 ($566,593.88 adjusted for
inflation39),40 so the practical concerns of holding the government liable
were not as serious as in Dalehite, where the claim was worth $2.2 billion.41
Similarly, the constitutional separation of powers concerns were not as
prevalent in this case, as it involved routine maintenance. 42 Thus, the
lurking practical and constitutional concerns that seemingly persuaded the
Court not to find liability in Dalehite were weaker in Indian Towing Co.
The Indian Towing Co. Court consequently cabined the discretionary
function exception for the first time. The government argued that because
the FTCA allowed for governmental liability “in the same manner and to
the same extent as a private individual,”43 the government could not then be
liable for “uniquely governmental” activities like the Coast Guard’s
maintenance of a lighthouse for which private individuals could not be
liable.44 The Court rejected this argument, reasoning that it would be
“bizarre” to find government liability based on whether private individuals
would be liable because the nature of the government’s activity would be
the same regardless.45 Further, the Court reasoned that if the government
eventually allowed private operation of lighthouses (which it eventually
did46), the “uniquely governmental” distinction would disappear and the
alleged negligence would become actionable, even though the action itself
had not changed.47
Then, two years after the Court limited the exception in Indian Towing
Co., the Court again revisited the discretionary function exception.
Rayonier, Inc., sued the government under the FTCA for its alleged
37
38
39

See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 61 (1955).
Id. at 64.
An inflation calculator was again used to calculate this figure. See Inflation Calculator, supra

note 7.
40

Indian Towing Co., 350 U.S. at 62.
See supra text accompanying notes 28–29.
42
See Indian Towing Co., 350 U.S. at 69 (“The Coast Guard need not undertake the lighthouse
service. But once it exercised its discretion to operate a light . . . and engendered reliance . . . it was
obligated to use due care to make certain that the light was kept in good working order . . . .”).
43
28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2012).
44
Indian Towing Co., 350 U.S. at 64.
45
Id. at 67.
46
The National Historic Lighthouse Preservation Act of 2000 (NHLPA) created a process for
transferring ownership of federal lighthouses to private owners. See 54 U.S.C. §§ 305101–06 (2012).
47
Indian Towing Co., 350 U.S. at 66.
41
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negligence in failing to timely extinguish a fire, which eventually spread
and damaged Rayonier’s property.48 The Court concluded that the
government could be liable if Washington law would impose liability “on
private persons or corporations under similar circumstances.”49 In other
words, the Court considered how state law would apply to determine
government liability under the FTCA. The Court justified this liability on
the basis of loss spreading, reasoning that when everyone benefits from
government activities, it is unfair to leave people to fend for themselves
when they are injured by such activities rather than holding the government
accountable.50 This reasoning illuminates another lurking practical concern:
whether loss spreading is fair and will help the afflicted parties.51
Lower court decisions emulated this type of ad hoc interpretation of
the discretionary function exception, deliberately avoiding articulating a
more exacting definition. In fact, courts recognized the futility of trying to
define the exception. For example, in Payton v. United States,52 an FTCA
lawsuit against the federal government involving a federal prisoner who
killed three people after being released, the Fifth Circuit opined:
The drafters of the Act . . . failed to define the term “discretionary function.”
This omission is understandable in light of the fact that the courts have
struggled for nearly three decades to provide such a definition, with limited
success. We will not pretend to succeed where our predecessors for thirty
years have failed in providing succinct definition of the term.53

This was a rare upfront acknowledgement that the courts had failed to
provide a more precise definition of the discretionary function exception.
So when it came to the defining the right of citizens to sue the government,
the Fifth Circuit was limited to ever-evolving and increasingly convoluted
precedent. 54

48

Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 316–17 (1957).
Id. at 318.
50
See id. at 320 (“Congress was aware that when losses caused by such negligence are charged
against the public treasury they are in effect spread among all those who contribute financially to the
support of the Government and the resulting burden on each taxpayer is relatively slight. But when the
entire burden falls on the injured party it may leave him destitute or grievously harmed.”).
51
Notably, the Court also cited Indian Towing Co. in rejecting immunity for “uniquely
governmental” activities like firefighters’ conduct. Id. at 319 (“[A]n injured party cannot be deprived of
his rights under the [FTCA] by resort to an alleged distinction . . . between the Government’s
negligence when it acts in a ‘proprietary’ capacity and its negligence when it acts in a ‘uniquely
governmental’ capacity.”).
52
679 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1982).
53
Id. at 479 (emphasis added).
54
See id. (“We will, however, review the guidelines presented by prior decisions and apply them to
the facts before us.”).
49
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B. Toward a Pragmatic Approach
The next major development in Supreme Court jurisprudence came in
the 1984 case of United States v. Varig Airlines.55 Varig Airlines sued the
government for the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) allegedly
negligent “spot check” program after passengers on a Varig Airlines
airplane certified by that agency were killed because of a fire in its
bathroom trash bin.56 The Supreme Court was remarkably transparent in its
opinion, beginning with the admission that “it is unnecessary—and indeed
impossible—to define with precision every contour of the discretionary
function exception.”57 Ultimately, the Court found that the FAA
employees’ actions in performing spot checks were protected by the
discretionary function exception.58
The Court explicitly justified its decision in Varig on the basis of the
same lurking constitutional and practical concerns from Dalehite. First, on
a constitutional level, the Court emphasized the goal of preventing “judicial
‘second-guessing’ of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in
social, economic, and political policy.”59 This statement mirrored dicta in
Dalehite, in which the Court “refused to question the judgments on which
[policy decisions] are based.”60 Second, on a practical level, the Court noted
the discretionary function exception’s purpose in “protect[ing] the
Government from liability that would seriously handicap efficient
government operations.”61 Hence, the Court had appeared to turn the corner
in openly discussing the broader practical and constitutional concerns
motivating its application of the discretionary function exception.
Such transparency did not come without cost; the Court broke with
prior precedent in Varig. For example, the Varig Court necessarily had to
break with Dalehite’s artificial distinction regarding the actor’s status.62
The Court in Varig underscored that “it is the nature of the conduct, rather
than the status of the actor, that governs whether the discretionary function
exception applies in a given case.”63 This statement directly rejected the
Court’s language in Dalehite, which claimed the “acts of subordinates in
carrying out the operations of government in accordance with official
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
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Id. at 797.
Id. at 813.
Id. at 821.
Id. at 814.
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 43 (1953).
Varig, 467 U.S. at 814 (quoting United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 163 (1963)).
For more on Dalehite’s distinction, see supra text accompanying notes 31–34.
Varig, 467 U.S. at 813 (emphasis added).
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directions cannot be actionable,”64 as the status of the government
employee as a subordinate or a supervisor was no longer relevant to the
discretionary function analysis. The Court in Varig also broke from Indian
Towing Co.’s artificial distinction of operational activities. In Indian
Towing Co., the Court refused to apply the discretionary function exception
to protect “operational” activities such as routine lighthouse maintenance.65
However, in Varig, the Court applied the discretionary function exception
to protect “efficient government operations,” such as routine airplane spot
checks.66
At this point, the FTCA’s discretionary function exception had
become a muddled and contradictory standard, with the Supreme Court
openly rejecting its prior distinctions while still refusing to provide a
precise definition. The Court had further confused things by adding more
tests to rationalize certain outcomes, such as employing state-law-derived
liability to justify loss spreading (as in Rayonier67) or using the
discretionary function exception to protect efficient government
functioning (as in Varig68).
C. More Confusion
Four years after Varig, the Court added more layers to the
discretionary function exception in an FTCA suit filed on behalf of a threemonth-old boy, Kevin Berkovitz, who contracted polio after receiving a
government-approved polio vaccine.69 The Court added two new
requirements to the nature-of-the-conduct test from Varig: (1) an element
of choice on the part of the employee70 and (2) the choice relating to a
government policy decision.71 The Court consequently reversed the holding
of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals that the government licensing of the
polio vaccine was discretionary, remanding the case to determine whether

64

Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 36 (emphasis added).
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 61 (1955) (emphasis added); see also id. at 76
(Reed, J., dissenting) (“The over-all impression from the majority opinion is that it makes the
Government liable under the [FTCA] for negligence in the conduct of any governmental activity on the
operational level.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
66
Varig, 467 U.S. at 814 (emphasis added) (quoting Muniz, 374 U.S. at 163).
67
See Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 318 (1957).
68
See Varig, 467 U.S. at 821.
69
See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 531 (1988).
70
Id. at 536 (“[C]onduct cannot be discretionary unless it involves an element of judgment or
choice [for the employee].”).
71
Id. at 539 (“The discretionary function exception applies only to conduct that involves the
permissible exercise of policy judgment.”).
65
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there was an element of choice that involved public policy considerations.72
Interestingly, under the new Berkovitz rule, the discretionary function
exception would not apply when an employee was following specific
orders: “In this event, the employee ha[d] no rightful option but to adhere
to the directive.”73 This formulation closely mirrored the operational–
planning distinction from Dalehite and Indian Towing Co. without using
that terminology. Still, the scope of the discretionary function exception
remained unclear.
Three years later, the Court used this mishmash of tests to immunize
the government in the 1991 case of United States v. Gaubert,74 in which a
shareholder of a savings and loan association sued the government, alleging
that federal financial regulators were negligent in their duties to supervise
corporate officers. 75 The Court attempted to synthesize its precedent,
finding that the discretionary function exception applied because the
federal regulators exercised choice in forming public policies (satisfying
the Berkovitz rule) and because the federal regulators were making
“planning-level decisions” (satisfying a combination of Dalehite and
Indian Towing Co.).76 But even while relying on this “planning-level”
language, the Court explicitly eliminated the formal operational–planning
distinction from Dalehite and Indian Towing Co.77 This presents a strange
set of circumstances: The Court, in attempting to clarify the discretionary
function exception by tearing down old distinctions, did so while still
relying on the very language it was purporting to eliminate.78 This attempt
at clarification further muddled the interpretation of the already vague
discretionary function exception.
To make matters worse, the Court added yet another wrinkle, stating
that the “routine or frequent nature of a decision” does not foreclose
discretionary function exception protection.79 The routine nature of an
activity had never previously been a factor in the discretionary function
72
Id. at 548 (remanding because the Court of Appeals prematurely invoked the discretionary
function exception). The district court originally denied the government’s motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 531.
73
Id. at 536.
74
499 U.S. 315 (1991).
75
Id. at 319–20.
76
Id. at 322–23.
77
See id. at 325–26 (“Discretionary conduct is not confined to the policy or planning level . . . .
There [is] no suggestion that decisions made at an operational level could not also be based on
policy.”).
78
Compare id. at 323 (“[T]here is no doubt that planning-level decisions . . . are protected by the
discretionary function exception.”), and id. at 335 (“[T]here is something to the planning vs. operational
dichotomy.”), with id. at 325 (“Discretionary conduct is not confined to the policy or planning level.”).
79
Id. at 334.
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exception, unless it was in reference to the now-outdated operationalversus-planning distinction raised in Dalehite and Indian Towing Co.80
These new factors distracted from the central point, briefly raised in Varig,
that the discretionary function exception protects “efficient government
operations.”81
The discretionary function exception had now been at least partially
defined by such varied metrics as the employee’s status,82 the operational–
planning distinction,83 and how state law would apply,84 but these same
metrics had been rejected as factors of a viable discretionary function test
in Varig85 and Gaubert.86 Indeed, as the Court has admitted, judicial
interpretations of the FTCA have failed to settle on a consistent standard.87
III. ATTEMPTS TO STREAMLINE THE DISCRETIONARY
FUNCTION EXCEPTION
The dynamic nature of the discretionary function exception makes it
especially difficult to properly define. Throughout its history, the
discretionary function exception has been analyzed in a variety of
frameworks, and scholars have offered various proposals to clarify the
doctrine. But these analyses and proposals have been unsuccessful in two
ways: they have failed to provide more clarity than the current test and to
align with the Court’s most recent precedent.
A new discretionary function test should do both things. First, there is
no point in proposing a new framework that is plagued by the same
ambiguities as the current discretionary function test. The doctrine will not
benefit from more discretion. Second, considering the Court’s stubborn
adherence to its precedent in this area, asking the Court to disregard its
precedent entirely is unlikely to be successful. Moreover, as the FTCA
plays an important role in controlling governmental liability, there should
be some consistency in how it is interpreted. A good proposal should
80

For more on this distinction, see supra text accompanying notes 31–34.
United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797,
814 (1984) (quoting United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 163 (1963)).
82
See supra text accompanying notes 31–34.
83
See supra text accompanying notes 31–34.
84
See supra text accompanying notes 49–51.
85
See supra text accompanying notes 62–66 (discussing Varig’s rejection of a status-of-theemployee test).
86
See supra text accompanying notes 77–78 (explaining Gaubert’s rejection of the operational–
planning distinction).
87
See, e.g., United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines),
467 U.S. 797, 813 (1984) (“[I]t is unnecessary—and indeed impossible—to define with precision every
contour of the discretionary function exception.”).
81
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therefore attempt to methodically synthesize the precedent. Scholarly
analyses and proposals have failed to provide such practical guidance for
the Court.
A. Inability to Keep Up with the Doctrine
Throughout the ad hoc judicial interpretation of the discretionary
function exception described above, scholarly literature has lagged in
efforts at analysis.88 At various points, academics have tentatively described
the discretionary function exception, but the Court’s ever-shifting tests
quickly mooted their analyses.89
Eventually, many scholars eschewed trying to explain the
discretionary function exception and instead began offering proposals to
cure the exception’s vagueness and ambiguity.90 The proposals offered,
however, have failed to provide greater clarity in their attempts to
incorporate and reason through the convoluted line of judicial precedents.91
88
See, e.g., Fleming James Jr., The Federal Torts Claims Act and the “Discretionary Function”
Exception: The Sluggish Retreat of an Ancient Immunity, 10 U. FLA. L. REV. 184 (1957) (describing
immunity for planning-level decisions before this distinction was erased in Varig); Osborne M.
Reynolds, Jr., The Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 57 GEO. L.J. 81
(1968) (similarly describing operational and planning activities before the distinction was erased in
Varig).
89
See, e.g., United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 325–26 (1991) (formally eliminating the
operational–planning distinction, outdating decades of prior academic analysis on that distinction).
90
See, e.g., Barry R. Goldman, Note, Can the King Do No Wrong? A New Look at the
Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 26 GA. L. REV. 837 (1991)
(proposing a distinction in FTCA claims based on economic versus physical harm); Harold J. Krent,
Preserving Discretion Without Sacrificing Deterrence: Federal Governmental Liability in Tort,
38 UCLA L. REV. 871, 882 (1991) (calling for a process-based test to protect independent actions taken
by agency officials when the agency’s policies provided discretion for that official).
91
For example, Barry Goldman’s proposal for a distinction in FTCA claims based on economic
versus physical harm, see supra note 90, runs contrary to at least four cases. First is Dalehite, in which
the Court found the government’s safety procedures for storing fertilizer were discretionary, even
though there were many deaths in the accident. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 41 (1953). Next,
he runs into issues with Indian Towing Co., as there the Court found maintenance of a lighthouse was
not discretionary, even though there were only economic harms. Indian Towing Co. v. United States,
350 U.S. 61, 61 (1955). Third, he faces difficulty with Rayonier, where although there were only
economic harms, the Court left open the possibility for liability. Rayonier, Inc. v. United States,
352 U.S. 315, 318 (1957). Lastly, his proposal overlooks how the Court in Varig found spot-checking
an airplane was discretionary, even though many deaths resulted from the occurrence. Varig, 467 U.S.
at 814.
Professor Krent’s proposal, see supra note 90, fares little better against the dynamic case law: A
circuit split has formed over whether the discretionary function exception protects agency action that is
the subject matter of policy discretion or only agency action that involves policy discretion. For
example, after an accident occurred during the EPA’s cleanup of an abandoned chemical facility, the
Third Circuit found the cleanup efforts were protected by the discretionary function exception because
the entire cleanup effort was the subject matter of policy discretion. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. United
States, 837 F.2d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 1988) (“[I]t is irrelevant whether the government employee actually
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These failures demonstrate that even academic proposals intended to clarify
the discretionary function exception fail to keep up with the courts’
dynamic interpretations of the discretionary function exception.92 The
discretionary function exception knot has been so twisted over the years
that it cannot be easily untangled.
1. Plain Text State Law Standard
The plain text of the FTCA holds the United States liable in
circumstances where a private person “would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.”93 One description of the discretionary function exception would
simply follow this language: if the government would be liable for its
actions under state law, then it is liable under the FTCA. It is unclear,
however, how this standard would interact with the numerous other
considerations the Court has explored. For example, the Court potentially
endorsed this state law standard in Rayonier, when the Court held the
government could be liable if state law would impose liability “on private
persons or corporations under similar circumstances.”94 However, Rayonier
did not involve other factors, such as an employee’s discretionary choice
informed by policy considerations.95 If these other factors had been
included, the Court could have discussed whether the state law standard is
always controlling for application of the discretionary function exception or
balanced economic, social, and political concerns in reaching his or her decision.”). By contrast, after a
man was hit by a boat and killed while snorkeling in a lake in a state park, the Tenth Circuit found the
Army Corps of Engineers’ decision not to warn swimmers of danger from boats was not protected by
the discretionary function exception because there was no evidence of any policy consideration. Boyd
v. United States, 881 F.2d 895, 898 (10th Cir. 1989) (“An alleged failure to warn swimmers of
dangerous conditions in a popular swimming area does not implicate any social, economic, or political
policy judgments with which the discretionary function exception properly is concerned.”).
92
Notably, both Goldman’s and Professor Krent’s proposals are more aligned with the recent case
law. Goldman’s distinction between economic and physical harm followed the two most recent FTCA
cases: in Gaubert, the Court applied the discretionary function exception to federal financial regulators
and barred liability for purely economic harms, Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322–23, and in Berkovitz, the
Court did not apply the discretionary function exception for the physical harm suffered by a threemonth-old boy who contracted polio from a vaccine, Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 548
(1988). Still, Goldman’s economic-versus-physical distinction did not hold up to the older case law
from Dalehite through Varig. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
Krent’s process-based proposal also followed Berkovitz: the Berkovitz Court had stated that if
agency policies “allow room for implementing officials to make independent policy judgments, the
discretionary function exception protects the acts taken by those officials in the exercise of this
discretion.” 486 U.S. at 546. However, a succeeding circuit split in the aftermath of Berkovitz foiled
Krent’s proposal. See supra note 91.
93
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
94
352 U.S. at 318.
95
Id. at 316 (only alleging “improper firefighting” as a cause of the damages, not an employee’s
discretionary choice).
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if it can be overshadowed by other factors (such as an employee’s
discretionary choice). Thus, although the state law standard is clear on its
face, it has not been robustly tested against other factors, and the remaining
ambiguity surrounding this potential interplay with other factors of the
discretionary function exception clouds any potential application.
2. Three-Part Threshold Test
A more complex description of the discretionary function exception
sets forth three requirements before the exception can be applied.96 First,
the Court must determine whether a uniquely governmental function was
involved.97 If so, then the Court must determine whether the employee had
a choice in the matter, instead of being instructed to act in a specified
manner.98 Finally, the Court must determine whether the choice involved
policy considerations, taking into account the employee’s status and the
subject matter of the decision.99 If all of these elements are satisfied, a court
can apply the discretionary function exception.
This three-part threshold test seemingly complies with judicial
precedent because it incorporates the latest discretionary function language
from Berkovitz with its requirement that an employee makes a voluntary
judgment call based on considerations relating to public policy.100 However,
this test also includes elements that have been expressly rejected by the
Supreme Court, such as the uniquely governmental function test101 and the
employee’s status.102 The proposal assumes that the discretionary function
exception has largely swallowed the liability rule, and it thus boldly calls
for the Court to reconsider its prior rejection of these factors to redefine the
discretionary function exception more strictly.103 But, as discussed above,
the Court is unlikely to completely overturn its own precedent. This
proposal is thus less than ideal, as it is impractical and would further
undermine any consistency in how the FTCA is applied.

96

See Amy M. Hackman, Note, The Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims
Act: How Much is Enough?, 19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 411, 445–46 (1997).
97
Id. at 445–46.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 539 (1988) (“The discretionary function
exception applies only to conduct that involves the permissible exercise of policy judgment.”).
101
This consideration was rejected in Indian Towing Co. See supra text accompanying notes 43–47
(discussing the Court’s rejection of this proposed test).
102
And this consideration was rejected in Varig. United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea
Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984); see also supra text accompanying notes 62–
66 (discussing the Court’s break with precedent to reject this potential test).
103
Hackman, supra note 96, at 446.
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3. Common Law Negligence Test
Third, another proposal finds that the text of the discretionary function
exception contributes little beyond common law negligence principles and
should simply be replaced by the same, even if the text remains
unchanged.104 This view, incidentally, aligns with the FTCA’s legislative
history, as expressed by Assistant Attorney General Shea in 1942: the
discretionary function exception should not provide any additional
protection beyond what the courts already provided through common law
negligence principles.105
This innovative proposal’s engineer, Professor William Kratzke,
argues that the gradual ad hoc development of the discretionary function
exception parallels the development of common law negligence and that, in
practice, courts do not apply the discretionary function exception when
they feel capable of evaluating the case on grounds similar to negligence.106
Professor Kratzke further argues that, because of its similarity to common
law negligence, any “inconsistency” in the application of the discretionary
function exception “should simply be accepted,” and that “[n]o more than
that can be expected.”107
This argument is less a proposal than an antiproposal: it is an
argument for the status quo. While it may be tempting to “simply accept” a
vague standard such as the discretionary function exception, such judicial
complacence passes the responsibility of applying the discretionary
function exception to the next judge on the bench. As previously discussed,
this fails to address the potential for misuse of the exception. In other
words, it supplies judges with too much discretion. Under this proposal,
nothing would prevent a judge from expanding the exception such that it
swallows the rule and eliminates the core purpose of the FTCA, thus
restoring blanket sovereign immunity and rendering the hard-won FTCA
moot.108 Or, veering in the opposite direction, a judge could virtually
eliminate the discretionary function exception by refusing to apply it at all,
leaving the government vulnerable to endless lawsuits from private citizens

104
See William P. Kratzke, The Convergence of the Discretionary Function Exception to the
Federal Tort Claims Act with Limitations of Liability in Common Law Negligence, 60 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 221, 222 (1986).
105
See supra text accompanying note 21.
106
See Kratzke, supra note 104, at 286 (“Quite simply, discretion disappears when a court feels
capable of assessing the relative values of B, P, and L.”).
107
Id. at 287.
108
The FTCA is a fragile legislative creation: it gestated in Congress for decades before it was
finally passed, and it has never been successfully amended in its seventy-one-year existence. See
Zillman, supra note 11.
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and threatening essential government functions. When the stakes are this
high, the law requires clearer guidance.
Finally, even if Professor Kratzke is correct that courts apply the
discretionary function exception whenever they feel capable of applying
common law negligence principles, then the Court should at least articulate
a factor-based standard to provide guidance for judges, such as proposed in
this Note.109 A factor-based standard provides a broader and more
comprehensive picture of how the discretionary function exception is
applied. Yet, it is not overly broad: enumerated factors reign in judicial
discretion by requiring judges to consider only those factors.
4. Eliminating the Discretionary Function Exception
Lastly, a more recent proposal calls for Congress to simply eliminate
the discretionary function exception entirely, arguing that common law
negligence principles would do a better job of defining meritorious cases
and advocating a bar on recovery for purely economic loss as an alternative
means to limit potential government liability.110 This argument, proposed
by Jonathan Bruno, is based partially on empirical grounds: the government
has enjoyed a 76.3% success rate in asserting the discretionary function
exception post-Gaubert, even as it has invoked the exception nearly twice
as often in the twenty-five years since Gaubert than in the forty-four years
prior to Gaubert.111 Bruno’s concern is that the discretionary function
exception is too broad a bar on potentially meritorious claims and that
courts should at least evaluate a case on the merits before dismissing it via
the discretionary function exception.112
This proposal simply substitutes one amorphous test for another.
Common law negligence principles are themselves vaguely defined yet do
not include several important considerations that courts have used in
applying the discretionary function exception to FTCA claims. For
example, the role of agencies and mandatory regulations in many FTCA
claims will necessarily implicate an analysis of whether the governmental
official had a choice under the Berkovitz test.113 Further, the role of
109
Such a standard may resemble Judge Learned Hand’s formula for common law negligence. See,
e.g., Barbara Ann White, Risk-Utility Analysis and the Learned Hand Formula: A Hand that Helps or a
Hand That Hides?, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 77 (1990) (describing how the Learned Hand formula involves a
factor-based test of estimated cost of risks weighed against the cost to avoid the risks).
110
Jonathan R. Bruno, Note, Immunity for “Discretionary” Functions: A Proposal to Amend the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 411, 414–15 (2012).
111
See id. at 430.
112
See id. at 414 (“The discretionary function exception is largely redundant because most of the
claims it now bars would ultimately fail on the merits, even absent immunity.”).
113
See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988) (introducing choice-of-employee
language).
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government as a party to FTCA suits implicates concerns over separation
of powers and protecting government’s core functions; indeed, these
concerns can be traced back to the legislative history of the original
statute.114 The concepts of common law negligence are simply not equipped
to resolve these thorny issues.
Moreover, for reasons previously discussed, a bar on purely economic
loss will not comport with existing precedent.115 This murky legal concept
has so far not featured in the Court’s interpretation of the discretionary
function exception—nor should it, as the exception is best clarified by
streamlining prior precedent into factors.
IV. A FACTOR-BASED STANDARD FOR THE DISCRETIONARY
FUNCTION EXCEPTION
The above analyses highlight the dilemma with the discretionary
function exception: it is too multifaceted to be resolved by a simple
proposal but too restricted by its own precedent to allow much room for
creativity in more complex proposals. Therefore, the best way to clarify the
discretionary function exception is not to add additional factors or to
resurrect eliminated distinctions; rather, the courts should simply and
clearly articulate the core guiding principles that the Court has been
implicitly relying on. These guiding principles date back to the FTCA’s
legislative history116 and have surfaced in the precedent as well.117
Articulating these principles in the form of a factor-based standard is the
superior approach, as it would eliminate confusion by cleanly breaking
with contradictory precedent and elucidating the practical and policy
concerns underlying the FTCA’s application.
A. Why Factors Are Necessary
A factor-based standard allows courts to simultaneously cabin and
preserve the discretionary function exception, fulfilling two primary
purposes of the FTCA: allowing citizens to sue the government and
protecting the government’s vital operations from endless private litigation.
Such a factor-based standard provides much-needed judicial guidance.

114

See supra Part I.
See supra note 91.
116
See supra Part I.
117
For example, the Court in Varig balanced the concern with judicial second-guessing of
legislative policy-related decisions, the desire to protect efficient government operations, and the
legislative intent to hold the government accountable for negligence. See supra text accompanying
notes 61–66.
115

897

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Without a factor-based standard, mixed judicial language creates
uncertainty in how the discretionary function exception should be applied.
For instance, language from past holdings has resurfaced in later
cases. In Gaubert, to take one example, the Court found that federal
regulators were making “planning-level decisions” in justifying the
application of the discretionary function exception,118 resuscitating the
operational–planning distinction from Dalehite.119 However, later in the
same opinion, the Court appeared to end the operational–planning
distinction, finding that “[d]iscretionary conduct is not confined to the
policy or planning level . . . . There [is] no suggestion that decisions made
at an operational level could not also be based on policy.”120 A factor-based
standard clears up this confusion by providing relevant considerations
while deliberately omitting irrelevant factors. In turn, this will allay
concerns about the amount of discretion involved in applying the
discretionary function exception.
The need for a factor-based test is especially relevant and pressing
today because there have been recent developments hinting at the
possibility of applying the FTCA to private litigation of foreign
governments, in addition to the federal government. For example, Congress
in 2016 voted to override President Barack Obama’s veto in passing a 9/11
Victims Bill, which allowed private citizens to directly sue the Saudi
Arabian government, or any other foreign government, in federal court for
any role played in deadly terrorist attacks on American soil.121 As the
FTCA increases in importance and scope, the need for clearer doctrine
grows.
B. The Excluded Factors
In creating a factor-based test, some factors should be excluded,
including at least three factors that have been explicitly ruled out by prior
FTCA precedent. First, the “uniquely governmental function” test was
rejected in Indian Towing Co. and Rayonier,122 so no matter what kind of
conduct the government is performing, it can be the basis of an FTCA
claim if the other requirements are met. Second, the “status of the

118

United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322–23 (1991).
See supra text accompanying notes 31–34 (discussing this distinction).
120
Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325–26.
121
See Jennifer Steinhauer et al., Congress Votes to Override Obama Veto on 9/11 Victims Bill,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2016), www.nytimes.com/2016/09/29/us/politics/senate-votes-to-overrideobama-veto-on-9-11-victims-bill.html [https://perma.cc/WV4N-B2VH].
122
See supra text accompanying notes 43–47, 51 (discussing the Court’s rejection of this test).
119
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employee” consideration was eliminated in Varig,123 so the rank of the
relevant government employee responsible for the alleged negligence is
immaterial, unless it relates to another factor.124 Finally, the operational–
planning distinction was eliminated in Gaubert,125 so the level of
decisionmaking is also immaterial, unless it is relevant for another factor.126
These factors: the uniquely governmental function test, the status-of-theemployee test, and the operational–planning test, have been left behind in
the ever-changing judicial interpretation of the FTCA and should be retired
for good. Omitting these outdated factors will clear up any confusion as to
their relevance.
C. The Proposed Factors
This Note proposes a test with three primary factors: (1) whether the
government employee exercised a choice, (2) whether the choice related to
policy considerations, and (3) whether the government employee’s
conduct, if performed by a private person, would violate state law. In
addition to these primary factors, courts must consider two other important
concerns under this proposed test: (1) practical concerns over inhibiting
essential government functioning127 and (2) a desire to minimize sovereign
immunity and allow private citizens to sue the government for wrongful or
negligent acts by its agents, officers, or employees.128
1. Whether the Government Employee Exercised a Choice
The first factor is whether the government employee exercised a
choice, which stems from the similar Berkovitz requirement that the
relevant government employee had a choice in the allegedly negligent act
or omission.129 While this requirement is broad, it interprets the word
“discretionary” by focusing on whether the employee had any discretion.
For example, an employee who was simply following orders would not be

123

See supra text accompanying notes 62–66 (discussing Varig’s rejection of such a test).
For example, it could relate to whether there was a choice relating to a policy consideration, or
if the employee was simply following orders without a choice. See infra Section IV.C.1 for additional
information on that proposed factor.
125
See supra text accompanying notes 76–78 (discussing Gaubert’s rejection of this distinction).
126
Like the status of the employee, see supra note 124, it may be relevant for whether there was a
choice relating to a policy consideration, which this Note proposes as a factor in Section IV.C.1, infra.
127
This has its roots in the FTCA’s legislative history. See supra Part I.
128
This was the desire that led to the FTCA’s passage in the first place. See supra Part I.
129
See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988) (“[C]onduct cannot be discretionary
unless it involves an element of judgment or choice [for the employee].”).
124
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protected under the discretionary function exception because the employee
lacked any discretion.130
One concern with adopting this factor is that if the courts strictly apply
the choice requirement, it will incentivize government bureaucracies to
provide less guidance, and potentially regulations, for their employees
because fewer directives will mean less potential liability. For example, if
enforcement was left to the discretion of individual employees due to lack
of any concrete guidelines in enforcing statutes and regulations, then the
government would never be liable because there would always be a
discretionary act. However, this fear is unfounded for three reasons.
First, the government does not decide on policy as a means of
avoiding liability—government functions to help resolve collective action
problems.131 So the government will not shirk enforcement of regulations
merely to avoid liability if the regulations help play a role in government
functioning. Second, while annual statistics of FTCA claims are not
published, FTCA payouts are constrained by a prohibition on punitive
damages and a reluctance to certify class actions.132 Thus, the potential
liability from the FTCA will not prevent government from functioning.
Third, even if the government were to provide employees with less
guidance in response to the choice requirement, the costs and benefits of
regulation are far from clear; it would be misleading to characterize all
deregulation as having a negative outcome.133

Thus, incorporating the Berkovitz choice requirement will do
nothing more than align the discretionary function exception with
existing precedent; fear of unintended consequences should not
outweigh the judiciary’s duty to clarify the scope of the law.
2. Whether the Choice Is Related to Policy Considerations
The second proposed factor is the nature of the choice; the employee’s
choice must be related to policy considerations.134 These policy

130
This also clarifies that the status of the employee is not independently relevant, especially in
light of Varig’s rejection of that consideration. See supra text accompanying notes 62–66.
131
See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of
Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 115 (2010).
132
See Donald N. Zillman, Presenting a Claim Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 43 LA. L. REV.
961, 980 & n.124 (1983).
133
See Robert W. Hahn & John A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Review and
Synthesis, 8 YALE J. REG. 233, 233 (1991) (finding there are large efficiency costs from economic
regulation).
134
This is based on the Court’s analysis in Berkovitz. See 486 U.S. at 539; see also supra text
accompanying note 72.
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considerations could be social, economic, or political in nature, as
described in Varig.135
While this is another broad requirement, it tethers the employee’s
choice to a broader system, which functionally excludes individual
employee decisions not reflective of the larger organization. For example,
an employee who chooses not to do his job would not be protected under
the discretionary function exception, because refusing to do one’s job is not
a policy-related decision. On the other hand, an employee deciding how to
allocate sparse resources in performance of his job-related duties could be
protected by the discretionary function exception because the resourceallocation decision would necessarily pertain to social, economic, or
political considerations. Thus, the government is protected when its
employees make decisions while completing their job-related duties, which
preserves government functioning.
But the government can still be vicariously liable for the actions of
rogue employees who act beyond the parameters of their job description—
those choices are not policy related and thus are not protected by the
discretionary function exception. This mirrors existing negligence law,136
which is in the spirit of the FTCA, as it allows citizens to hold the
government liable as citizens could do with a private party.137 The policyrelated choice requirement would therefore balance the competing concerns
behind the FTCA: it would ensure that the government is liable for
stepping beyond the line of its official duties while protecting essential
government operations.
3. Whether the Government’s Conduct Violated Any State Law
As reflected in the FTCA,138 and as discussed in Rayonier,139 the third
proposed factor considers the existence of any state law violations resulting
from the conduct of the federal government. If the employee’s conduct
violates state law in a manner such that a “private person” would be liable
135
See United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S.
797, 814 (1984) (“Congress wished to prevent judicial ‘second-guessing’ of legislative and
administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an
action in tort.”).
136
See, e.g., Butler v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 1150, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (affirming that a
school’s allocation of teachers in supervising rowdy students could not be considered negligent).
137
As previously noted, the FTCA aims to hold government liable “in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2012).
138
See id. § 1346(b)(1) (holding the government liable where its actions, if taken by “a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred”).
139
See supra text accompanying notes 49–50 (discussing the Rayonier Court’s consideration of
this factor).
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for that conduct, that alone would be sufficient for an FTCA claim. This
factor is fairly straightforward and consistent with precedent, such as
Rayonier.140
4.

Protecting Government Functioning vs. Minimizing
Sovereign Immunity
The factor-based standard must also consider the policy guidelines
underlying the FTCA. Two guidelines can be discerned from the FTCA’s
legislative history: (1) practical concerns over inhibiting essential
government functioning, as balanced against (2) the desire to minimize
sovereign immunity and allow private citizens to sue the government for
wrongful or negligent acts by its agents, officers, or employees.141
On top of the delineated factors, these concerns should play a role in
any application of the FTCA: to what extent will government liability
impair essential government functioning? If liability will not cripple the
government’s essential functioning and the other FTCA elements are met,
then the discretionary function exception should not protect the government
because the entire purpose of the FTCA was to pull back the curtain of
sovereign immunity as long as it did not impair essential government
functioning.
*

*

*

Thus, this proposed standard for the discretionary function exception
has three factors: (1) whether the government employee exercised a choice,
(2) whether that choice related to policy considerations, and (3) whether the
government’s conduct violated any state law. Concerns such as the status
of the actor, whether the conduct was operational or planning in nature, and
whether the conduct was governmental conduct are all irrelevant unless
they speak to any of the three relevant factors. Additionally, this test
balances potential deleterious effects on proper governmental functioning
with the goal of deterring governmental negligence and restoring private
parties who were injured by such negligence. Most importantly, the closedended, factor-based standard proposed here will prevent future judicial
interpretation from adding unworkable and contradictory factors to the
discretionary function exception. In this way, it will simultaneously cabin
and preserve both the exception and the FTCA at large.

140
141
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See supra text accompanying notes 49–50.
See supra Part I (discussing these concerns as related to the passage of the FTCA).
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CONCLUSION
The Court may be understandably reluctant to employ a factor-based
standard for the discretionary function exception, hoping that Congress will
instead clarify the scope of the exception through an amendment to the
statutory text. But this wait-and-see approach is misguided. First, Congress
has neglected to update the language of the discretionary function
exception for the past seventy years, and there is no sign Congress plans to
revisit the statute. Second, this congressional silence could potentially be
interpreted as legislative approval of the judicial interpretation of the
discretionary function exception. A factor-based standard aligned with
existing case law would solidify this implicitly approved judicial
interpretation without adding anything new. Third, a factor-based test
would place limits on future judicial interpretation of the discretionary
function exception; such limits are needed to prevent the government from
being over- or underexposed to liability under the FTCA. Fourth, the FTCA
will only grow in importance with an expanding government bureaucracy
and an increasingly complex society, so this problem must be dealt with
sooner rather than later. Finally, the potential for the FTCA to be applied to
foreign governments, in addition to the United States government, only
raises the stakes for the discretionary function exception: a clearer rule will
increase predictability in foreign affairs by setting firmer limits on potential
liability. Without this predictability, the United States risks alienating
important allies and undermining the broader concept of diplomatic
immunity. For these reasons, the Court should adopt the factor-based
standard proposed in this Note.
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